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Recent work by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) considers the prob-
lem of group identiﬁcation from a social choice perspective. These
authors provide an axiomatic characterization of a “liberal” aggrega-
tor whereby the group consist of those and only those individuals each
of which views oneself a member of the group. In the present paper
we show that the ﬁve axioms used in Kasher and Rubinstein’s charac-
terization of the “liberal” aggregator are not independent and prove
that only three of their original axioms are necessary and suﬃcient for
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The problem of group identiﬁcation can be formulated as follows: Given
a group of individuals, how to deﬁne the extent of a subgroup of it? In
very recent papers (Billot (2003), Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), Samet and
Schmeidler (2003)) this problem has been related to formal models from
social choice and voting theory.
Kasher’s (1993) paper on collective identity can be considered as a ﬁrst,
non-formal attempt to look at the group identiﬁcation problem as an ag-
gregation task. In that paper the author views that each individual of a
society has an opinion about every individual, including oneself, whether the
latter is a member of a group to be formed. The collective identity of the
group to be formed is then determined by aggregating opinions of all the
individuals in the society. The formal link between Kasher’s approach and
the theory of aggregators mainly developed in economic theory (Rubinstein
and Fishburn (1986)) was made by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997). In the
latter paper the authors provide axiomatic characterization of three aggre-
gators: the “dictatorship” aggregator whereby a pre-designated member of
the society determines who deserves to became a group member; the “oli-
garchical” aggregator whereby the decision is taken by consensus among the
members of a pre-designated subgroup of the society; and the “liberal” ag-
gregator whereby the group consist of those and only those individuals each
of which views oneself a member of the group. The ﬁrst two characteriza-
tions are based on previous results by Fishburn and Rubinstein (1986) and
2Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) whereas the characterization of the “liberal”
aggregator is new.
Two of the ﬁve axioms used for the characterization of this new “liberal”
aggregator are called consensus (C) and monotonicity (MON). These axioms
are very familiar in the social choice literature and, in fact, sound plausible
when imposed as requirements on a collective identity aggregator. Consensus
says that if an individual is deﬁn e da sag r o u pm e m b e rb ye v e r yo n ei n
the society, then this individual should be considered as a socially accepted
group member; and, correspondingly, if no one deﬁnes this individual as a
group member, then he or she should not deserve the social acceptance as
a group member. On the other hand, monotonicity describes what happens
if someone changes his opinion in favor of a given individual provided that
this individual already enjoys the social acceptance as a group member. The
exact deﬁnitions of (C) and (MON) are given in the next section.
These two axioms, in combination with other three diﬀerent axioms are
used by Kasher and Rubinstein to reach logically the “liberal” aggregator.
In order to show the independence of the axioms these authors construct
examples (one for each axiom) that satisfy all axioms but the considered
one. However, a careful check of the examples for (C) and (MON) convince
us that both do not satisfy some of the other proposed axioms either and, in
addition, that these examples can not be repaired.
This fact shadows the characterization result of Kasher and Rubinstein
and constitutes the main motivation for this paper. Section 2 presents the
basic notation and axioms used for the characterization of the “liberal” ag-
gregator, as well as the examples for (C) and (MON). Section 3 collects
our results and it ﬁrst shows that (C) is implied by three of the other ax-
ioms used in Kasher and Rubinstein’s original characterization. Moreover,
3we prove that the same three axioms (being independent) are necessary and
suﬃcient to reach the axiomatic characterization of the “liberal” aggregator.
The latter fact indicates that these axioms imply (MON) as well. Hence, a
simpliﬁcation of the corresponding axiomatic system is reached.
2 Basic notation and axioms
Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set of all individuals in the society. Each
individual i ∈ N forms a set Vi ⊆ N consisting of all society members that
in the view of i deserve to be accepted as group members. A proﬁle of views
is an n-tuple V =( V1,...,V n) where Vi ⊆ N for every i ∈ N.L e tV be the
set of all proﬁles of views, i.e., V =( P(N))n where P(N) is the power set of
N.Acollective identity function (CIF) J : V → P(N) assigns to each proﬁle
V ∈ V as e tJ(V ) ⊆ N of socially accepted group members.
Deﬁnition 1 The strong liberal CIF J∗ is deﬁned as follows.
J
∗(V )={i ∈ N | i ∈ Vi} for every V ∈ V.
The ﬁve axioms used for characterization of J∗ in Kasher and Rubinstein
(1997) are consensus (C), symmetry (SYM), monotonicity (MON), indepen-
dence (I), and liberal principle (L). Each of these axioms is deﬁned as follows.
• AC I FJ satisﬁes consensus (C) if for every V ∈ V,
— i ∈ Vk for every k ∈ N implies i ∈ J(V ),a n d
— i/ ∈ Vk for every k ∈ N implies i/ ∈ J(V ).
• AC I FJ satisﬁes symmetry (SYM) if, for every V ∈ V and for every
i,j ∈ N,
4— Vi − {i,j} = Vj − {i,j},
— i ∈ Vk ⇔ j ∈ Vk, for every k ∈ N − {i,j},
— i ∈ Vi ⇔ j ∈ Vj,
— i ∈ Vj ⇔ j ∈ Vi,
imply i ∈ J(V ) ⇔ j ∈ J(V ).
• AC I FJ satisﬁes monotonicity (MON) if, for every V ∈ V and for
every i,j ∈ N,
— i ∈ J(V )
— V 0
j = Vj ∪ {i},
— V 0
k = Vk for every k ∈ N − {j},
imply i ∈ J(V 0).
• AC I FJ satisﬁes independence (I) if, for every V,V 0 ∈ V and for every
i ∈ N,
— k ∈ J(V ) ⇔ k ∈ J(V 0) for every k ∈ N − {i},
— i ∈ Vk ⇔ i ∈ V 0
k for every k ∈ N,
imply i ∈ J(V ) ⇔ i ∈ J(V 0).
• AC I FJ satisﬁes liberal principle (L) if, for every V ∈ V,
— k ∈ Vk for some k ∈ N implies J(V ) 6= ∅,a n d
— k 6∈ Vk for some k ∈ N implies J(V ) 6= N.
5Kasher and Rubinstein prove that the above ﬁve axioms characterize J∗
(Theorem 1(a) in Kasher and Rubinstein (1997, p. 389). That is, the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 1 The strong liberal CIF J∗ is the only CIF that satisﬁes ax-
ioms (C), (SYM), (MON), (L), and (I).
Moreover, in order to show the independence of these axioms (Theorem
1(b) in Kasher and Rubinstein (1997, p. 390-391) the authors construct
examples (one for each axiom) that satisfy all axioms but the considered
one. They use the following examples for (C) and (MON).
Example (C): Let n be an odd number. Consider the CIF J deﬁned as
follows. For every proﬁle V ∈ V, J(V )={i ∈ N | i ∈ Vi} if the
cardinality of {i ∈ N | i ∈ Vi} is odd and J(V )={i ∈ N | i 6∈ Vi}
otherwise.
Example (MON): Consider the CIF J deﬁned by J(V )={i ∈ N | Vi =
{i}} for every V ∈ V, i.e. a J is anyone who considers only oneself to
be a J.
However, the example for (C) does not satisfy (L) either. To see this, let
n =3(odd number) and let V ∈ V be a proﬁle such that V1 = V2 = V3 = ∅.
Then the proposed CIF produces J(V )={1,2,3} since #{i ∈ N | i ∈ Vi} =
#∅ =0(even number). Hence, there is a proﬁle of views such that i 6∈ Vi for
some i ∈ N and J(V )=N. It contradicts (L).
On the other hand, the example for (MON) does not satisfy (C), (L), and
(I) either. Take n =3and let V ∈ V be a proﬁle such that V1 = V2 = V3 =
{1,2}. According to the proposed aggregator we have J({1,2},{1,2},{1,2})=
6∅. Hence, although 1 and 2 are deﬁned as group members by every one in the
society, they are not socially accepted, and it contradicts (C); and although
1a n d2d e ﬁne themselves as group members, the ﬁnal group is empty, and
it contradicts (L). To see that this aggregator does not satisfy (I) as well
take again n =3and let V,V 0 ∈ V with V =( {1},{2,3},{1}), V 0 =
({1},{2},{1}). According to the proposed aggregator we have J(V )={1}
and J(V 0)={1,2}.N o t i c e t h a t k ∈ J(V ) ⇔ k ∈ J(V 0) for k =1 ,3 and
2 ∈ Vk ⇔ 2 ∈ V 0
k for k =1 ,2,3. Nevertheless, 2 / ∈ J(V ) and 2 ∈ J(V 0), i.e.
(I) is violated.
In what follows we show that these examples can not be “repaired”.
3 Axiomatization of the strong liberal aggre-
gator
In this section, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the strong liberal
CIF as deﬁned by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) by using only three of their
original axioms: (SYM), (I), and (L). For that purpose we ﬁrst show that (C)
is implied by (SYM), (I), and (L). Given an arbitrary 4-partition of N and two
special proﬁles depending on it, we then point out a very useful connection
between any CIF satisfying the above three axioms and the strong liberal
CIF. This connection is used to prove our characterization result. Finally,
we show the independence of the axioms as well.
73.1 The consensus axiom
Let us ﬁrst have a look at some properties of CIFs satisfying (I), (L), and








n ) with V
S
k = S for every k ∈ N.
Obviously, for every CIF J satisfying (C), we have J(V S)=S for every
S ⊆ N. The following lemma says that the same holds for every CIF J
satisfying (SYM), (I), and (L).
Lemma 1 If a CIF J satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L), then J(V S)=S for
every S ⊆ N.
Proof. In order to proof the lemma, we show that, for every CIF J satisfying
(SYM), (I), and (L),
J(V
S)=S and J(V
N−S)=N − S for every S ⊆ N
by induction of the cardinality #S of S. Obviously, J(V S)=S and J(V N−S)=
N − S for every S ⊆ N is equivalent to J(V S)=S for every S ⊆ N.
Let J be a CIF satisfying (SYM), (I), and (L). From (SYM), each of J(V S)
and J(V N−S) must be one of ∅, S, N − S and N, i.e., J(V S),J(V N−S) ∈
{∅,S,N− S,N} for every S ⊆ N.
Basis Step: Suppose #S =0(i.e., S = ∅). Then, we have J(V S),J(V N−S) ∈
{∅,N}.F r o m( L ) ,w eh a v eJ(V S) 6= N and J(V N−S) 6= ∅. Therefore,
J(V S)=∅ = S and J(V N−S)=N = N − S.
Induction Step: For each m ≥ 0,a s s u m eJ(V S)=S and J(V N−S)=
N − S for every S ⊆ N with #S = m,a n ds h o wJ(V S)=S and
J(V N−S)=N − S for every S ⊆ N with #S = m +1 .
8Recall that J(V ∅)=∅ and J(V N)=N.T h u s , J(V S)=S and
J(V N−S)=N − S when S = N. Suppose S 6= N. Obviously, from
#S>0, S is nonempty. Since S 6= N and S 6= ∅,f r o m( L )e a c ho f
J(V S) and J(V N−S) is neither ∅ nor N.T h u s ,w eh a v eJ(V S),J(V N−S) ∈
{S,N − S}.
Let i ∈ S,a n dl e tˆ S = S −{i}. Obviously, #ˆ S =# S −1=m.B yt h e
induction hypothesis, we have J(V
ˆ S)=ˆ S and J(V N−ˆ S)=N− ˆ S.F r o m
(I), we have J(V S)=S; otherwise, i.e., J(V S)=N −S, (I) is violated,
because k ∈ J(V S) if and only if k ∈ J(V N−ˆ S) for every k ∈ N − {i},
and i ∈ V S
k and i ∈ V
N−ˆ S
k for every k ∈ N,b u ti 6∈ J(V S) and
i ∈ J(V N−ˆ S). Again from (I), we have J(V N−S)=N − S;o t h e r w i s e ,
i.e., J(V N−S)=S, (I) is violated because k ∈ J(V N−S) if and only if
k ∈ J(V
ˆ S) for every k ∈ N − {i},a n di ∈ V
N−S
k and i ∈ V
ˆ S
k for every
k ∈ N, but i ∈ J(V N−S) and i 6∈ J(V
ˆ S).
Therefore, J(V S)=S and J(V N−S)=N − S for every S ⊆ N.
With the help of Lemma 1 we reach our ﬁrst reﬁnement of Kasher and
Rubinstein’s axiomatic system.
Theorem 1 If a CIF satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L), then it also satisﬁes (C).
Proof. The theorem is proven by contradiction. Suppose there exists a CIF
J that satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L), but (C). Then, there exists a proﬁle
V ∈ V such that, for some i ∈ N,
• i ∈ Vk for every k ∈ N but i 6∈ J(V ),o r
• i 6∈ Vk for every k ∈ N but i ∈ J(V ).
Suppose there exists i ∈ N such that i ∈ Vk for every k ∈ N but i 6∈ J(V ).
Let S = J(V ) ∪ {i}. From Lemma 1, we have J(V S)=S = J(V ) ∪ {i}.
9However, (I) is violated, because, k ∈ J(V ) if and only if k ∈ J(V S) for every
k ∈ N − {i},a n di ∈ Vk and i ∈ V S
k for every k ∈ N,b u ti 6∈ J(V ) and
i ∈ J(V S).
Suppose there exists i ∈ N such that i 6∈ Vk for every k ∈ N but i ∈ J(V ).
Let S0 = J(V ) − {i}.T h e mf r o mL e m m a1 ,w eh a v eJ(V S0)=S0 = J(V ) −
{i}. However, (I) is violated, because, k ∈ J(V ) if and only if k ∈ J(V S0
) for
every k ∈ N − {i},a n di 6∈ Vk and i 6∈ V S0
k for every k ∈ N, but i ∈ J(V )
and i 6∈ J(V S0
).
Now we can conclude that every CIF that satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L)
also satisﬁes (C), and the proof is completed.
Remark 1 Notice that (L) and (SYM) do not appear in the proof of Theorem
1, but both of them are applied in Lemma 1.
3.2 A partition lemma
Before we show that the strong liberal CIF J∗ is the only CIF that satisﬁes
(SYM), (I), and (L), let us slightly extend Lemma 1. Let P =( P1,P 2,P 3,P 4)
be an arbitrary 4-partition of N,a n dl e tV (P,0),V(P,1) ∈ V be proﬁles deﬁned







P1 ∪ P2 if k ∈ P1 ∪ P3,







P1 if k ∈ P1 ∪ P3,
P1 ∪ P2 if k ∈ P2 ∪ P4.
By deﬁnition of the strong liberal CIF J∗,w eh a v eJ∗(V (P,0))=J∗(V (P,1))=
P1 ∪ P2.
Lemma 2 If a CIF J satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L), then J(V (P,0))=
10J(V (P,1))=P1 ∪ P2 for every 4-partition P of N.
Proof. Let J be a CIF satisfying (SYM), (I), and (L). From Theorem 1, J
satisﬁes (C), and thus,
• P1 ∪ P2 ⊆ J(V (P,0)) and P4 ∩ J(V (P,0))=∅,a n d
• P1 ⊆ J(V (P,1)) and (P3 ∪ P4) ∩ J(V (P,1))=∅.
Moreover, from (SYM), P3 ⊆ J(V (P,0)) or P3 ∩ J(V (P,0))=∅,a n dP2 ⊆
J(V (P,1)) or P2∩J(V (P,1))=∅.T h e r e f o r e ,J(V (P,0)) is P1∪P2 or P1∪P2∪P3,
and J(V (P,1)) is P1 or P1 ∪ P2. In the following, we show by contradiction
that J(V (P,0)) 6= P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3 with P3 6= ∅,a n dJ(V (P,1)) 6= P1 with P2 6= ∅.
Suppose J(V (P,0))=P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3 with P3 6= ∅.L e ti ∈ P3. Notice that
i 6∈ V
(P,0)
i and {k ∈ N | i ∈ V
(P,0)
k } = P2 ∪ P4. Consider the proﬁle V 0 ∈ V







N if k ∈ P2,
(P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3) − {i} if k ∈ (P1 ∪ P3) − {i},
N − {k} if k ∈ P4 ∪ {i}.
Then, we have (P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3) − {i} ⊆ J(V 0) from Theorem 1, and either
P4 ∪ {i} ⊆ J(V 0) or (P4 ∪ {i}) ∩ J(V 0)=∅ from (SYM). Thus, J(V 0) is
either (P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3) − {i} or N.F r o m( L )a n di 6∈ V 0
i ,w eh a v eJ(V 0) 6= N.
Therefore, J(V 0)=( P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3) − {i}. However, (I) is violated, because
k ∈ J(V (P,0)) if and only if k ∈ J(V 0) for every k ∈ N − {i},a n d{k ∈ N |
i ∈ V
(P,0)
k } = {k ∈ N | i ∈ V 0
k} = P2 ∪ P4 (i.e., i ∈ V
(P,0)
k if and only if i ∈ V 0
k
for every k ∈ N), but i ∈ J(V (P,0)) and i 6∈ J(V 0).
Suppose J(V (P,1))=P1 with P2 6= ∅.L e ti ∈ P2.N o t i c et h a ti ∈ V
(P,1)
j
and {k ∈ N | i ∈ V
(P,1)
k } = P2 ∪ P4. Consider the proﬁle V 00 ∈ V deﬁned as







{k} if k ∈ P1 ∪ {i},
P1 ∪ {i} if k ∈ (P2 ∪ P4) − {i},
∅ if k ∈ P3.
Then we have ((P2∪P3∪P4)−{i})∩J(V 00)=∅ from Theorem 1, and either
P1 ∪ {i} ⊆ J(V 00) or (P1 ∪ {i}) ∩ J(V 00)=∅ from (SYM). Thus, J(V 00) is
either ∅ or P1 ∪ {i}.F r o m ( L ) a n d i ∈ V 00
i ,w eh a v eJ(V 00) 6= ∅.T h e r e f o r e
J(V 00)=P1 ∪ {i}. However, (I) is violated, because, k ∈ J(V (P,1)) if and
only if k ∈ J(V 00) for every k ∈ N − {i},a n d{k ∈ N | i ∈ V
(P,1)
k } =
{k ∈ N | i ∈ V 00
k } = P2 ∪ P4 (i.e., i ∈ V
(P,1)
k if and only if i ∈ V 00
k for
every k ∈ N), but i 6∈ J(V (P,1)) and i ∈ J(V 00). Now we can conclude that
J(V (P,0))=J(V (P,1))=P1 ∪ P2 for every 4-partition P of N.
Remark 2 Lemma 2 can be considered as an extension of Lemma 1, since,
for every S ⊆ N, V S = V (P,0) = V (P,1) with P =( S,∅,∅,N− S).
Remark 3 From Lemma 2 and J∗(V (P,0))=J∗(V (P,1))=P1 ∪ P2 for every
4-partition P of N, it follows that J(V (P,0))=J∗(V (P,0)) and J(V (P,1))=
J∗(V (P,1)) for every 4-partition P of N.
3.3 The characterization
Now we are ready for our characterization result.
Theorem 2 The strong liberal CIF J∗ is the only CIF that satisﬁes (SYM),
(I), and (L).
Proof. Obviously, the strong liberal CIF J∗ satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L).
Suppose there exists a CIF J that satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L), and J 6= J∗.
It follows that there exists a proﬁle V for which J(V ) 6= J∗(V ).T h a t i s ,
there exists i ∈ N such that
12• i ∈ J(V ) and i 6∈ J∗(V ),o r
• i 6∈ J(V ) and i ∈ J∗(V ).
Then, let
M0 = {k ∈ J(V ) − {i}|i 6∈ Vk},
M1 = {k ∈ J(V ) − {i}|i ∈ Vk},
N0 = {k ∈ (N − J(V )) − {i}|i 6∈ Vk},
N1 = {k ∈ (N − J(V )) − {i}|i ∈ Vk}.
Notice that M0∪M1 = J(V )−{i}, N0 ∪N1 =( N −J(V ))−{i}, M0 ∪N0 =
{k ∈ N − {i}|i 6∈ Vk} and M1 ∪ N1 = {k ∈ N − {i}|i ∈ Vk}.
Suppose i ∈ J(V ) and i 6∈ J∗(V ).T h e nw eh a v ei 6∈ Vi.L e tV 0 ∈ V be





     
     
M0 ∪ M1 if k ∈ M0,
M0 ∪ M1 ∪ N0 ∪ {i} if k ∈ M1,
M0 ∪ M1 if k ∈ N0 ∪ {i},
M0 ∪ M1 ∪ N0 ∪ {i} if k ∈ N1.
F r o mL e m m a2a n dV 0 = V (P,0) with P =( M0,M 1,N 0∪{i},N 1),w eh a v e
J(V 0)=J∗(V 0)=M0 ∪ M1 = J(V ) − {i} with i ∈ J(V ). However, (I) is
violated, because k ∈ J(V ) if and only if k ∈ J(V 0) for every k ∈ N − {i},
and {k ∈ N | i ∈ Vk} = {k ∈ N | i ∈ V 0
k} = M1 ∪ N1 (i.e., i ∈ Vk if and only
if i ∈ V 0
k for every k ∈ N), but i ∈ J(V ) and i 6∈ J(V 00).
13Suppose i 6∈ J(V ) and i ∈ J∗(V ). Then, we have i ∈ Vi.L e tV 00 ∈ V be





     
     
M0 if k ∈ M0,
M0 ∪ M1 ∪ {i} if k ∈ M1 ∪ {i},
M0 if k ∈ N0,
M0 ∪ M1 ∪ {i} if k ∈ N1.
F r o mL e m m a2a n dV 00 = V (P,1) with P =( M0,M 1∪{i},N 0,N 1),w eh a v e
J(V 00)=J∗(V 00)=M0 ∪M1 ∪{i} = J(V )∪{i} with i 6∈ J(V ). However, (I)
is violated, because, k ∈ J(V ) if and only if k ∈ J(V 00) for every k ∈ N −{i},
and {k ∈ N | i ∈ Vk} = {k ∈ N | i ∈ V 00
k } = M1 ∪N1 ∪{i} (i.e., i ∈ Vk if and
only if i ∈ V 00
k for every k ∈ N), but i 6∈ J(V ) and i ∈ J(V 0).
Now we can conclude that if a CIF J satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L), then
J(V )=J∗(V ) for every proﬁle V ∈ V, i.e., J = J∗. Therefore, the strong
liberal CIF J∗ is the only CIF that satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L).
From the monotonicity of the strong liberal CIF J∗, the following corollary
can be obtained immediately from Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 If a CIF satisﬁes (SYM), (I), and (L), then it also satisﬁes
(MON).
Furthermore, in the following, we show that the three axioms (SYM), (I),
and (L) are independent.
Theorem 3 The strong liberal CIF J∗ is not the only CIF that satisﬁes some
b u tn o ta l lo f( S Y M ) ,( I ) ,a n d( L ) .
Proof. The proof consists of three examples, each of which satisﬁes exactly
two of the three axioms.





J∗(V ) if n =1(i.e., N = {1}),
{1} otherwise.
Obviously, J satisﬁes (I) and (L) when n =1 .S u p p o s en>1.S i n c e
k ∈ J(V ) if and only k ∈ J(V 0) for every k ∈ N and for every V,V 0 ∈ V,
J satisﬁes (I). Moreover J(V ) is neither ∅ nor N, and thus, J satisﬁes
(L).
N o ww es h o wt h a tJ does not satisfy (SYM). It is obvious from J 6= J∗
when n>1. But, in order to show it directly, let n>1 and consider a
proﬁle V such that Vk = {1,2} for every k ∈ N.N o t i c et h a te v e r yC I F
satisfying (SYM) must either include both 1 and 2 or exclude both 1
and 2. However, J(V )={1}, and thus J does not satisfy (SYM).





J∗(V ) if J∗(V ) ∈ {∅,N},
N − J∗(V ) otherwise.
Since J∗ satisﬁes (L) and J(V ) ∈ {∅,N} if and only if J∗(V ) ∈ {∅,N},
J satisﬁes (L). Since J∗ satisﬁes (SYM), J∗,d e ﬁned by J∗(V )=N −
J∗(V ) for every V ∈ V, also satisﬁes (SYM). Moreover, since J(V ) ∈
{J∗(V ),J∗(V )} for every V ∈ V, it follows that J(V ) satisﬁes (SYM).
Now we show that J does not satisfy (I). Let n>1 and consider proﬁles
V and V 0 such that Vk = N −{1} and V 0
k = ∅ for every k ∈ N.N o t i c e
that J(V )={1} and J(V 0)=∅,a n d1 6∈ Vk and 1 6∈ V 0
k for every
k ∈ N.T h u s ,J does not satisfy (I).
• Consider a CIF J deﬁned as follows. For every V ∈ V,
J(V )=∅.
15Since k ∈ J(V ) if and only if k ∈ J(V 0) for every k ∈ N and for every
V,V 0 ∈ V, J satisﬁes (SYM) and (I). Consider a proﬁle V such that
Vi = {i} for every i ∈ N.W eh a v eJ(V )=∅, but every CIF satisfying
( L )m u s tn o tb ee m p t yf o rs u c hap r o ﬁle V .T h u s ,J does not satisfy
(L).
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